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 CHURCH AND STATE RELATIONS IN PRESENT-DAY SERBIA
By Angela Ili
Angela Ili is a free-lance journalist and a part-time lecturer at the Novi Sad
Theological Faculty. She is a Hungarian citizen living in Belgrade. This
article is a part of her master’s thesis “Church and State Relations in
Present-Day Serbia”, which was defended at the Catholic University of
Leuven, Belgium in June 2004.
PART III
The Societal Reality of Religious Freedom and Tolerance
The Echo of Religious Legislation and Policies in Serbian Society
The gap in the legal regulation of church and state affairs in Serbia has had
consequences not only for the religious communities but also for Serbian society as a whole.
Although regulating still unresolved areas of the existing legal framework of church and state
affairs appears to be a priority for the present government, it has been a very slow-moving
process. In the meantime, there are several issues regarding the state of religious freedom and
tolerance in society, which need to be explored.
Religion is an important issue for most Serbs, as 95% of the total population declared
a religious affiliation in the 2002 census.  Laws regarding the status and activities of religious1
communities therefore have an effect on the overwhelming majority of the population, and as
such, this subject has been in the center of political and social dialogue for the last few years.
Interviews with several religious leaders and a study of a sample of publications by
religious communities show that they agree on the most urgent issues that need to be
resolved. The return of confiscated or nationalized property is one of the most important
ones. This question has been on and off the agenda of various governments since 1991 but
legislation still has not been brought. In the meantime, religious communities are waiting for
numerous buildings of worship, parochial homes, agricultural land and other property to be
returned to them and many religious groups, including the Jewish Community and the
Reformed Christian Church, continue to be very negatively affected by this situation.  Some2
 Rev. Katalin Réti, pastor of the Christian Reformed Church in Subotica, interview by author via e-mail,3
9 April 2004, the author’s translation from the Hungarian original.
 Rev. Andrija Kopilovi, pro-rector of the Theological-catechetical Institute of the Roman Catholic Church4
in Subotica, interview by author via e-mail, 14 April 2004 and Prof. Mevlud effendi Dudi, director of the Gazi-Isabeg
Medresa in Novi Pazar, interview by author via e-mail, 1 April 2004.
 Prof. Mevlud effendi Dudi, interview by author, and Olenka Živkovi, layperson in the Greek Catholic5
Church and associate at Dzvoni magazine (published for Ruthenians and Ukrainians living in Serbia) and Julian Rac,
parish priest of the Greek Catholic Church in Belgrade, interview by author via e-mail, 7 April 2004.
 See Branko Bjelajac and Dane Vidovi (eds.), Udar na Verske Slobode. A collection of texts on the6
position of Protestant multi-national religious minority groups in Serbia. (Belgrade: Alfa i Omega, 2001).
 “Uredba o organizovanju i ostvarivanju verske nastave i nastave alternativnog predmeta u osnovnoj i7
srednjoj školi”, Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, 46 (2001).
 Rev. Katalin Réti, interview by author and Rev. Andrija Kopilovi, interview by author.8
 Rev. István Csete-Szemesi, interview by author and Rev. Katalin Réti, interview by author.9
 Prof. Mevlud effendi Dudi, interview by author.10
 Rev. Andrija Kopilovi, interview by author. 11
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local governments have been providing limited financial assistance for the maintenance and
renovation of religious buildings but these are individual cases and they always depend on the
local situation. Katalin Réti, pastor of the Christian Reformed Church in Subotica, suggests
that “a direct way for believers to support their own religious communities through a certain
percentage of their taxes” be made possible.  Other important issues waiting to be resolved3
include the clarification of the legal position of theological faculties,  and the legal status of4
employees of religious communities.5
The introduction of religious instruction in public schools has been a controversial
topic ever since discussions about it began. Especially smaller Protestant and Evangelical
communities wanted a more inclusive approach and hoped that the laws would include them
among the religious communities, whose religious instruction the state would finance.   The6
seven religious communities specified in the Government Directive on the Organization and
Establishment of Religious Education from 2001  on the whole have been able to organize7
religious instruction relatively successfully. However, the lack of finances and personnel, as
well as the small number of students per school presents obstacles in many cases, especially
for the smaller religious communities.  As of 2004, the greatest number of students was8
attending Serbian Orthodox religious instruction throughout the country. The Reformed
Church was conducting religious instruction in several places throughout the northern
autonomous province of Vojvodina.  Islamic religious education was present in all schools of9
the Sandžak region and the Preševo Valley (in the south-western and southern regions of
Serbia, respectively).  Catholic religious instruction was available for pupils in every school10
of the Subotica Diocese and was present in many places in the other two dioceses, those of
Belgrade and Zrenjanin.  Greek Catholics were providing religious instruction in several11
 Olenka Živkovi, and Julian Rac, interview by author.12
 Rabbi Isak Asiel, interview by author.13
 Prof. Dr. Jovan Mihalji, then-secretary of the South-East European Adventist Union, interview by14
author via e-mail, 5 May 2004 and Ana Palik-Kunak, superintendent of the Evangelical-Methodist Church, interview
by author in Novi Sad, 21 December 2004.
 Zorica Kuburi, ‘Realizacija Verske Nastave u Osnovnim i Srednjim Školama,’ CEIR – Center for15
Empirical Research of Religion, Novi Sad, www.ceir.co.yu (accessed 19 April 2004).
 International Religious Freedom Report 2004, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and16
Labor, U.S. Department of State, 15 September 2004.
 Paul Mojzes, ‘Religious Human Rights in Post-Communist Balkan Countries,’ in John Witte, Johan David17
Van der Vyver (eds.), Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective: Legal Perspectives  (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1996),
277.
 See Angela Ili, “Church and State Relations in Present-day Serbia (I)”, Religion in Eastern Europe 618
(2004): 35-36.
RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE XXV, 2 (MAY 2005) page 42.
places of Vojvodina, including Novi Sad.  The Slovak Lutheran Church was also present in12
many schools throughout Vojvodina, while, due to small numbers, the Jewish Religious
Community was mainly conducting its religious education off of school premises, with the
exception of one high-school student in Novi Sad.  Religious communities which do not13
have permission to conduct religious education in public schools, such as the Adventist
Church and the Methodist Church, continued to organize instruction in their own buildings of
worship.  In an opinion poll conducted in May 2003 in 12 elementary and 10 secondary14
schools in Serbia, students and parents assessed the necessity, content and results of religious
instruction in a strongly positive manner.  15
The Special Position of the Serbian Orthodox Church
In Serbia all religious communities are considered equal in the constitution.
However, as observers point out, “the majority Serbian Orthodox Church receives some
preferential consideration”  and “the Serbian Orthodox Church has been offered a special16
status as the church of the Serbian nation and has been given media and other support.”  The17
lack of regulation regarding the legal position of religious communities in the country has left
a vacuum, which has been to the clear advantage of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Although
the Church does not enjoy the status of an established religion anymore, it has nonetheless de
facto taken up the role of an indispensable national church. The Serbian government has been
less than ambiguous about embracing Serbian Orthodoxy. As mentioned in my earlier
article,  leading politicians and political parties have made a clear stand of support for the18
Serbian Orthodox Church and its primacy in Serbian society, and this tradition seems to be
continued by the government that was formed in March 2004. The Serbian Orthodox Church
has also been the main recipient of the government’s financial assistance for religious
 Prof. Dr. Sima Avramovi from Belgrade University, one of the authors of the Draft Law on Religious19
Freedom, interview by author, Belgrade, 5 January 2004.
 These and the following data are from the results from the 2002 nation-wide census in the Republic of20
Serbia (Belgrade: Bilten Republikog Zavoda za Statistiku, May 2003), see footnote 1.
 Ibid.21
 For more details, see the official web site of the Serbian Orthodox Church, www.spc.yu.22
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communities in recent years.  In 2003, the state-owned postal service decided to contribute19
financially to the construction of the Saint Sava cathedral in Belgrade, by temporarily raising
the price of their postage stamp, so that citizens (Orthodox or not) had no choice but “donate”
a few extra dinars to this cause with each letter they sent. 
One important thing we should not forget is that Serbia is an ethnically,
linguistically, culturally and religiously very heterogeneous society. The 2002 census lists 63
different religious groups and denominations present in Serbia.  Geographically, the greatest20
number of religious communities is found in Vojvodina, where due to historical
developments there is a great diversity. The province is home to the majority of Catholic,
Reformed and Lutheran believers. The presence of the Serbian Orthodox Church is greatest
in Central and South Serbia, while in Kosovo and the bordering Sandžak and Bujanovac-
Preševo-Medvepa areas, Muslims form a significant religious community.
After the collapse of Yugoslavia, as Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia
became independent the demographic balance in the new, rump-Yugoslav state changed
radically. Serbian Orthodoxy became the absolute majority religion, as many Croats and
Hungarians (mostly Catholics and Protestants) left the country in the early 1990s due to direct
or indirect pressure on them. At the same time, waves of primarily Orthodox refugees and
internally displaced persons entered the country from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo,
strengthening the numerical advantage of the Serbian Orthodox Church. As one can see from
the latest census results, there is now a vast difference in the number of adherents to Serbian
Orthodoxy (84.97%) and the second largest religion, Catholicism (5.5%).21
In recent years the situation in Kosovo has been a very important issue for the
Serbian Orthodox Church, as is evident from the large number of public statements,
publications and personal visits to the province by Patriarch Pavle and other clergy in high
positions.  The Church has condemned the continual destruction of Serbian historic and22
religious monuments (many of which are of outstanding cultural and historical importance),
as well as the violence against Serbs living in the province. Kosovo remains in the center of
attention and the wave of ethnic hostilities in March 2004, which was exhibited partly
 Mojzes, op. cit., 266-268.23
 Ibid., 267.24
 Ibid., 269.25
 See Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 9 of the European Convention26
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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through acts of religious intolerance toward Serbian Orthodox churches and other religious
sites, gave further cause to the Serbian Orthodox Church to keep raising the issue in the
Serbian political sphere through meetings with government officials and representatives of
international organizations.
Religious Freedom
Paul Mojzes describes four different types of arrangements in Europe regarding
religious human rights: Ecclesiastic Absolutism, “only one religious organization is
supported by the state”, Religious Toleration, “religion as such is preferred and supported by
the state”, Secularistic Absolutism “religion as such is rejected by the state”, and Pluralistic
Liberty “the state is really indifferent and neutral toward religion or non-religion” He asks the
question whether it is possible to move from a secularistic absolutist society to pluralistic
liberty.  This, indeed, lies at the heart of the issue of religious freedom in Serbia today. As23
Mojzes explains, the Communist state viewed Marxism-Leninism as providing the only full
understanding of the world,  but now hostility toward religion is not a guiding force in24
government policies anymore. Although, he says, pluralistic liberty is difficult to be achieved
fully, the intention of modern societies should be towards “pluralism and freedom for all
views and practices, except those most patently destructive.”25
Although today there is undeniably a significant degree of religious freedom in
Serbia, nonetheless, the situation is still far from being ideal. The International Helsinki
Federation for Human Rights, the US State Department, Human Rights Watch and
other international organizations and foreign government agencies periodically point out
restrictions on religious freedom in the actions and attitudes of the Serbian government and
media in their reports. I will briefly highlight a few relevant issues.
a) The Issue of Proselytism
One of the aspects of the freedom of religion, as it is expressed in international
documents of human rights protection,  is the freedom to be able to change one’s belief. The26
Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Serbia and
 Article 26 §1 states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, belief and religion;27
including to freedom to remain committed to one's belief or religion or to change them at one's own choosing.”
 Silvio Ferrari, ‘Religious Liberty and Proselytism in Europe,’ unpublished lecture, from the author’s28
notes, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 5 November 2003.
 Mojzes, op. cit., 271.29
 Michael Radu, ‘The Burden of Eastern Orthodoxy’ Religion in World Affairs 42 (1998): 292.30
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Montenegro  guarantees this right. The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia from 1990,27
however, does not explicitly mention the right to change one’s religion. The primarily
Orthodox culture and Serbia’s history make proselytism a very sensitive issue, which has
been much debated in Serbia for centuries. Historically, Catholics have represented the
greatest threat to Orthodox Christians in this area. The Muslim Ottoman Empire, on the other
hand, was hardly, if ever, involved in directly encouraging conversions to Islam, rather, it
applied pressure on non-Muslims in indirect ways, such as levying disproportionately higher
taxes on them. Proselytism is regarded very negatively in Orthodox societies for several
reasons. Firstly, because of the autocephalous nature of their church, religious and national
identities are intertwined. The Serbian Orthodox Church also has the claim as the defender of
national values; therefore proselytism becomes a cultural, as well as a religious issue. As
years of Communist rule ended, leaders of the Serbian Orthodox Church, as elsewhere in
Eastern Europe, were hoping to recover their “lost faithful” but instead they found themselves
fighting over them with other religious groups. As Silvio Ferrari claims, the Orthodox
Church, which regards other Christian denominations as sister churches, did not expect
proselytism from them in what they claimed was a “Christian country.”  As Paul Mojzes28
describes the situation in the whole of the Balkans, “currently one can observe an area-wide
struggle between the dominant church or religion that wishes to restrict the activities of rival
denominations and the numerous old and new religious groups that are threatened by the
prospect of monopoly (or establishment) by the dominant national church (religion).”29
The historical struggle for political and spiritual control between the Catholic and
Orthodox churches on the territory of Yugoslavia has been partly driven by what Michael
Radu describes as “the key Serbian Orthodox argument for a Greater Serbia, i.e., the alleged
historic mission of the Serbs to protect Orthodoxy from the double threat of Mecca and the
Vatican.”  The conflict with the Catholic Church has for long had an ethnic dimension: the30
struggle against Croat nationalism. Since the end of the wars following the breakup of
Yugoslavia, the Roman Catholic Church within Serbia has become much smaller and
relatively “safer” in the eyes of the Serbian Orthodox Church. As the total number of
 The category “Catholic” in the census includes, among others, Roman Catholics and Greek Catholics.31
 Calculations based on the results from the 2002 nation-wide census in the Republic of Serbia (Belgrade:32
Bilten Republikog Zavoda za Statistiku, May 2003), www.statserb.sr.gov.yu (accessed 18 May 2004).
 The total number of Catholics in Serbia has dropped by 85,000 since the 1991 census, claims Dragana33
Radisavljevi iparizovi in Branislav Radivojša, ‘Povratak Tradiciji’ (Politika, 31 May 2003).
 One thing that may be in Msgr. Hoevar’s favor is that he is a Slovene, the representative of a relatively34
“neutral” ethnic group.
 Miroslav Volf, ‘Fishing in the Neighbor’s Pond: Mission and Proselytism as Challenge to Theology and35
Church Life in Eastern Europe,’ Religion in Eastern Europe 16 (1996): 37.
 In Serbia the word “sekta” is used to describe a very wide range of religious or quasi-religious groups36
and esoteric cults. Whereas in English ‘sect’ is often used to denote various smaller denominations without any
pejorative meaning, in Serbian there is no such distinction, so small Protestant communities, for example, are
sometimes grouped together with Satanists in this category.
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Catholics  is roughly 6.5% of the Serbian Orthodox Church’s adherents,  they do not31 32
represent as great a danger for Serbs as it was perceived in pre-1991 Yugoslavia.  Relations33
between the two churches have improved significantly in recent years. This is in part
undoubtedly the result of the tireless efforts of Stanislav Hoevar, Archbishop of Belgrade,
and of Pavle, Serbian Orthodox Patriarch, at building bridges among religious communities
through inter-religious dialogue and common religious activities.34
The conflict over proselytism between the Serbian Orthodox Church and the
Protestant churches has been a rather different story. Here, the ethnic dimension has never
really played a role. Instead, the basic source of tension lies in differences in theology.
According to Miroslav Volf, these include differing perspectives on the church, the
relationship between church and culture, the relationship between church and state and on
what it means to be a Christian.  Although proselytism in Serbia by Protestants had existed35
historically, it gained new momentum at the beginning of the 1990s, as part of a phenomenon
occurring throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Proselytism by foreign and domestic group
became widespread and of much concern for the traditional churches. Converts to other faiths
who come from an Orthodox background often face great pressure and antagonism from their
friends, family and sometimes even from the local Serbian Orthodox clergy.
b) Small Religious Communities and the Issue of ‘Sects’36
As with other countries experiencing change and upheaval, the disintegration of the
communist system meant the influx of a large range of religious and esoteric groups into
Serbia. Some potentially harmful cults have also appeared which has alarmed the leaders of
traditional churches and political groups. 
In Serbia, universally acknowledged human rights are protected on an individual
level. This provides freedom for individuals to have or not have religious convictions. The
 Vjekoslav Perica, Balkan Idols: Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States (Oxford: Oxford University37
Press, 2002), 15.
 International Religious Freedom Report 1999, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and38
Labor, U.S. Department of State, 9 September 1999.
 Report on Religious Discrimination and Related Violations of Helsinki Commitments: Yugoslavia,39
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, 2002, www.ihf-hr.org (accessed 19 April 2004).
 Dragoljub Djordjevi, ‘Tipovi Verskog Oganizovanja’ in Crkva, Država i Civilno Društvo (Belgrade:40
Centar za Demokratiju, 2000), 133-144.
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principle of the separation of church and state ensures that this can be done without
interference from the state. Religious communities as such, however, do not enjoy any
specific legal protection, and this situation, coupled with the unresolved issue of registration,
leaves them vulnerable in the eyes of the law and against religious intolerance. As Vjekoslav
Perica explains, “after the fall of communism… the major local religions and ethnic
nationalistic regimes considered domestic religious minorities and foreign missionaries a
gross threat, harassed their leaders, obstructed their development of new places of worship,
attacked them in the media, and sometimes even persecuted their members.”  The U.S. State37
Department found in 1999, that “in practice both the Government and the legal system
provide very little protection for the religious rights of minority groups.”  The International38
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights quotes in its 2002 report on religious discrimination in
Serbia one of the leading domestic experts on the sociology of religion, Professor Dragoljub
B. Djordjevi, who warns that anti-cult campaigners in the media “create a tremendous
confusion with regard to religious communities, in particular the small ones and endanger the
religious rights of their members.”  Looking at current international sociological research,39
Djordjevi proposes a list of characteristics, which may help identify potentially dangerous
cults and on the other hand also provide a description of what a legitimate religious
community or denomination is.40
c) Human Rights within Religious Communities
As the importance of the protection of human rights and the ensuring of religious
freedom has become an important agenda item for the Serbian government, the issue of
respect for human rights within religious communities may sooner or later also surface in the
discussion. Although the skeptical attitude of the government toward the internal issues of
religious communities during Communism has been replaced by more trust, nonetheless the
way religious communities respect the rights of their faithful is still an important issue and
will certainly become the focus of societal dialogue in the near future.
 Rik Torfs, A Healthy Rivalry: Human Rights in the Church (Leuven: Peeters Press, 1995), 14-16.41
 Gerald F. Powers, ‘Religion, Conflict and Prospects for Reconciliation in Bosnia, Croatia and42
Yugoslavia,’ Journal of International Affairs 50 (1996): 221-252.
 Rabbi Isak Asiel, interview by author.43
 Rev. Katalin Réti, interview by author.44
 Rev. Andrija Kopilovi, interview by author.45
 Prof. Mevlud effendi Dudi, interview by author, the author’s translation from the Serbian original.46
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Professor Rik Torfs identifies a few arguments used against human rights in the
church. Although his focus is primarily on the Roman Catholic Church, his arguments are
relevant for other religious communities as well. Firstly, he says, human rights limit the
power of the hierarchy; secondly, the authorities fear that “making room for human rights in
the church puts Orthodoxy at risk;” and thirdly, the vision of the law – or its absence -
operative among the church hierarchy determines the authorities’ suspicion and hostility
toward human rights.  As the Serbian Orthodox Church is built on hierarchy and has a41
strongly centralized structure, by definition this does not leave room for individual rights to
be held as a priority. Gerald F. Powers partly justifies the failure of the Serbian Orthodox
Church to be a strong and consistent witness for human rights by saying that it reflects an
“understandable pastoral priority given one’s own flock.”42
d) Discrimination on the Basis of Religious Identity
Leaders of minority religious communities, when asked whether their members enjoy
the same rights and job opportunities as Orthodox believers do, give differing responses.
Rabbi Isak Asiel claims that no such discrimination exists against individual Jewish believers.
Others admit that discrimination on religious grounds is present in Serbian society.43
However, it is often difficult to exclusively link religious identity as opposed to ethnic
belonging to such incidents. Rev. Katalin Réti thinks that discrimination against Reformed
Christians is primarily based on their Hungarian ethnicity, as all Reformed in Vojvodina are
Hungarian.  Rev. Andrija Kopilovi admits that although relations between the Roman44
Catholic Church and the Serbian Orthodox Church are good, subtle discrimination does exist
towards non-Orthodox believers on a personal level.  Professor Mevlud effendi Dudi,45
director of the Gazi-Isabeg Medresa in Novi Pazar categorically states that Muslims do not
enjoy the same rights in everyday life as Orthodox believers do, “in spite of promises and a
few small steps taken by the previous [Djindji] government.”  The U.S. Department of46
State says that during 2003 and 2004 “the Belgrade Islamic community reported continued
 International Religious Freedom Report 2004, released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and47
Labor, U.S. Department of State, 15 September 2004.
 Branko Bjelajac, “Serbia: Religious Freedom Survey, August 2004 – Attacks on Religious Minorities48
in 2003”, 5 August 2004, http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id=387 (accessed 6 August 2004).
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difficulties in acquiring land and government approval for an Islamic cemetery near the
city.”47
e) The State of Religious Tolerance in Society
Just how religiously tolerant is Serbian society? The answer to this question is
assessed very differently by representatives of various religions. The Serbian government’s
own assessment would probably also differ from that of international organizations, who for
years have warned of the religious intolerance present in Serbia. A few important issues to
remember is the great diversity of religious identities in the country, their historical
interaction with each other, and the adversity towards everything non-Serb and non-Orthodox
that certain political parties and media have fanned since the breakup of Yugoslavia. To a
large extent, Tito built Yugoslavia on the importance of tolerance. The Titoist slogan
“Brotherhood and Unity” echoed positively in Yugoslav ears for decades. The brutal wars
following the breakup of the country shattered this ideal. People saw that their differences
proved to be stronger than their common characteristics and experience and that this led to
tragedy in the end. Bitter disappointment left many people disillusioned, who had seen
Yugoslavia as an ideal for a society embracing its diversity. The notion of tolerance lost its
former value in the eyes of many Serbs.
Today, attacks of violence especially against smaller religious communities are,
unfortunately, too regular to ignore. Sometimes even the clergy or the buildings of the
majority Serbian Orthodox Church are the target of such acts. Although several of these
incidents occur against establishments that also represent a specific ethnic minority,
numerous examples of clearly religiously motivated acts of violence and vandalism
undoubtedly exist. Oslo-based Forum 18 News Service publishes a yearly account of attacks
on religious minorities in Serbia and Montenegro. They claim that “Evangelical-Methodists,
Jews, Seventh Day Adventists, Serbian Evangelicals, Jehovah Witnesses, Lutherans, Romany
Pentecostals, Baptists, Hare Krishna devotees, Catholics, and Muslims were all victims of
different types of attack in 2003, ranging from hate speech and graffiti to physical assaults.”48
A common characteristic of such cases is that the perpetrators are hardly ever caught by the
 “Antisemitske  parole protiv B92”, 22 March 2005, www.b92.net (accessed 23 March 2005) and49
“Antisemitizam na fasadama” (Politika, 23 March 2005): 10.
 “Napadnut sveštenik”, based on the report of Beta News Agency (Politika, 29 January 2005): 9.50
 B. Ž., “Vandalizam u Novom Kneževcu: oskrnavljeno spomen-obeležje” (Politika, 30 January 2005):51
11.
 Beta News Agency, 28 March 2004, www.beta-news.com (accessed 5 April 2004).52
 Forum 18 News Service, http://forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id280 (accessed 20 March 2004).53
 Report from Church of God minister Obrad Nikoli in Niš to Forum 18, 19 March 2004.54
 Report from Baptist pastor Žarko Djordjevi in Novi Sad to Forum 18, 27 February 2004.55
 Rev. Katalin Réti, interview by author.56
 Humanitarian Law Agency, 5 June 2003, www.hlc.org.yu (accessed 23 April 2004).57
 Forum 18 News Service, 17 April 2003.58
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police and brought to justice. Far from striving to present a complete account of such acts, a
few recent examples demonstrate the diversity of the religious communities that are targeted: 
# During the night of 21-22 March 2005 anti-Semitic posters and graffiti, partly
directed against B92 television and radio station and two non-governmental
organizations, appeared in several locations in Belgrade. Messages were spray-
painted on the wall in front of the Jewish graveyard and at the entrances to the offices
of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia and the Humanitarian Law
Center. President of Serbia Boris Tadi, the Serbian government, numerous political
parties, as well as some religious leaders immediately condemned these messages.49
# On 28 January 2005 a group of youngsters verbally insulted Jovo Andan, a Serbian
Orthodox priest in Prijepolje.50
# During the night of 26-27 January 2005 unknown perpetrators vandalized the
memorial to Holocaust victims in the town of Novi Kneževac.  The incident took51
place immediately after the sixtieth anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz
concentration camp.
# On 27 March 2004 the Catholic cemetery in Subotica was vandalized.  52
# On 18 March 2004, in reaction to the renewed wave of violence in Kosovo against
ethnic Serbs living in the province and the destruction of Serbian Orthodox churches
and monasteries, mobs vandalized and set fire to mosques in the city centers of
Belgrade and Niš.  The Serbian government, the Serbian Orthodox Church, the53
Roman Catholic Church and other religious communities such as the Protestant-
Evangelical Church, among others, condemned these incidents.
# That same night, two Molotov cocktails were thrown at the Bible Cultural Center run
by a local Church of God congregation in Niš.  54
# During the night of 26-27 February 2004, unknown perpetrators broke the windows
of the Baptist church in Novi Sad.  55
# In January 2004, unknown persons flooded the basement of the Reformed church in
Sombor. Graffiti saying, “Serbia is an Orthodox land” also appeared on the walls of
the Reformed churches in Sombor and Panevo.56
# On the night of May 24, 2003, unknown attackers set fire to the house of Dragana
Bukomirovi in Beli Potok by throwing Molotov cocktails at it. Bukomirovi is
chairwoman of the Sanatan-sansta Association for Spiritual Learning.57
# On 16 April 2003 Adventist Pastor Josip Tikvicki was hospitalized with a concussion
“after being severely beaten in the night of 15-16 April when he challenged people
who were attacking his church in the city of Zrenjanin.”  58
 B92 News Service, 25 January 2002, www.b92.net (accessed 14 March 2004).59
 Ibid.60
 Forum 18 News Service, 14 August 2003 (accessed 19 March 2004).61
 Siniša Maleševi, Ideology, Legitimacy and the New State: Yugoslavia, Serbia and Croatia (London:62
Frank Cass Publishers, 2002), 293.
 World Evangelical Alliance, 20 August 2003, http://www.evangelicalalliance.org.au (accessed 20 January63
2004).
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# On 24 December 2002 a mob of about 50 people with icons and candles in their
hands physically prevented Anglican believers from entering the Patriarchate of the
Serbian Orthodox Church in Belgrade, where their congregation was to celebrate
Christmas at the invitation of Patriarch Pavle. Among those gathered for the Anglican
service was the British ambassador to Yugoslavia and other foreign diplomats. The
Serbian Orthodox Church and then-president of Yugoslavia Vojislav Koštunica both
issued statements condemning the incident as shameful and contradicting Orthodox
and universal Christian values.59
# In November 2002 the local government of Panevo decided to reconstruct the
German Lutheran-Reformed graveyard, but the graveyard was in fact “partially
destroyed” by the workers.  60
# In April 2002 “a hand grenade was thrown at the newly built Jehovah's Witness
kingdom hall in Vrbas.”  61
Representatives of religious communities and non-governmental organizations keep
raising their voices regularly and demand that the government react to and investigate such
violent attacks against religious communities.
f) The Role of the Media
Siniša Maleševi states that “two systems or apparatuses, educational and
informational, are the main channels of ideology dissemination in every modern society.”62
As during Tito’s reign Yugoslavia’s educational system and media were both in the hands of
the state, this task was made easier by their automatically assumed and expected cooperation.
Today, media controlled by the state are still powerful but independent media are also
flourishing. What is the general message that comes across considering religious
communities? What role, if any, do journalists play in fostering religious tolerance in Serbian
society?
 “One problem,” according to the World Evangelical Alliance, “is that the media are
extremely politicized and little more than a tool for the political elite, for whom Serb
nationalism is a popular vote winner.”  The U.S. Department of State claims that during63
2004 “antisect propaganda continued in the Serbian press, which labels minority Christian
churches – including Baptists, Adventists, and Jehovah's Witnesses – and some other
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minority faiths “sects.” Religious leaders have noted that instances of vandalism often occur
soon after press reports on sects.”64
A list of violent attacks from 2002 compiled by Forum 18 clearly illustrates this
point:
# “On 16 November 2002 the ‘Glas javnosti’ daily newspaper tried to connect ‘Novi
Život’ (Campus Crusade for Christ) with the suicide of student Milan Kiranski, in
the context of ‘dangerous sects’ that are active in Serbia.”  65
# “During March 2002 Jehovah’s Witnesses were very negatively portrayed in
‘Vranjske novine,’ the local newspaper of Vranje. A house that supposedly belonged
to them and that was reported on in the previous edition was stoned, because they
were repeatedly called sects.”  66
# “From 24 February to 2 March the Adventist church in Belgrade was stoned three
times. On 26 February, on BK TV, there was a repeated TV program in which
Protestants were very negatively portrayed and Adventists were associated with
Satanists. On 4 March a group of high school students yelled and threatened people
at the front door of the Belgrade Adventist church. Police intervened and went to the
neighboring school to interview and warn the students.”67
Religious hate speech continues to be a problem which is all too often present in the
Serbian media. This is partly a legacy of the wars and the surrounding propaganda of the
1990s. In his article “How to Make Enemies” Miroslav Kiš depicts the various phases that
lead individuals as well as societies to see their former neighbors and best friends as enemies.
These begin with consciously creating a distance, and through the use of propaganda and
depicting the group in question as a scapegoat, it culminates in the rationalization of evil.68
This aptly describes the progression that took place in the Serbian media before, during and
after the wars of the 1990s. Throughout 1997 “the programming of the state-controlled TV
Belgrade regularly [included] the demonization of certain ethnic and religious groups.”  The69
1998 publication ’Hate Speech’ in the Balkans of the International Helsinki Federation for
Human Rights observed (three years after the end of the Bosnian war) that the Catholic
Church and Islam were still continually depicted by the Serbian media as the main enemies of
Serbdom and Orthodoxy.  As Professor Mevlud effendi Dudi charges, “state-owned70
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television… has until now permanently equated Islamic attitudes with those of terrorists and
fundamentalists.”  It will be an enormous challenge not only for the media but also for71
Serbian society in general to move away from the stereotypes they have embraced. Although
article 51 of the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Fundamental Freedoms  of72
Serbia and Montenegro (as well as article 44 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia)
prohibits the instigation of religious intolerance and hatred, little seems to have been done so
far to enforce its stipulations.73
Religious leaders agree that the extremist and intolerant views expressed (sometimes
even by clerics themselves) do not reflect the official theology and position of any of the
major religious communities in Serbia. The powerful impact of the media nonetheless needs
to be recognized.
Signs of Hope: Inter-Religious Dialogue
On a more positive note, dialogue has been taking place in the last few years among
representatives of various religious communities. The importance several religious groups
attach to such meetings is shown by the fact that they usually send their highest level
representatives. As we have seen, the government has also been involved in talks with
representatives of religious communities during the preparation phases of the draft laws on
religious freedom and on religious instruction in public schools. This is a welcome sign of
cooperation and will hopefully lead to a deepening of mutual respect between the state and
the religious communities. All the religious leaders I have interviewed agree that ongoing
dialogue among the various religious communities is an indispensable factor in building a
pluralistic and religiously tolerant society. Belgrade Catholic Archbishop Monsignor
Stanislav Hoevar stresses that the religious dimension should be viewed as the most
important one in inter-religious dialogue: only this will lead to “reconciliation, peace,
involvement, voluntarism and hope.”  He also points out that religious communities need to74
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be secure in their own identity if they want to enter into societal dialogue.  This view is75
echoed by Belgrade sociologist Professor Milan Vukomanovi, who hopes that inter-religious
dialogue will also continue without international pressure, as religious communities become
more confident and independent.76
One of the examples of inter-religious cooperation from the last few years is the
Maribor Initiative,  the main goal of which is to bring reconciliation among religious77
communities and focus on building democracy, respecting human rights and religious
minorities in South-Eastern Europe. The meeting of the round table discussions of 14 and 15
December 2001, which were, among others, attended by Archbishop Hoevar and Mufti of
the Sandžak region Muarem effendi Zukorli, resulted in the Belgrade Declaration on
Religious Communities and Religious Freedoms in a Democratic Society.  The Declaration78
emphasizes the importance of inter-religious reconciliation and dialogue. Many other
discussions have taken place in recent years, exploring the place of religion in society, the
relationship of the state and religious communities and other topics. Although they signal an
important step of cooperation, just how much practical benefits they will lead to remains to
be seen. 
As an example of practical cooperation, in January 2004 Archbishop Hoevar
preached at an ecumenical church service, which was held in a Lutheran church in Subotica,
and led by Superintendent of the Evangelical Christian (Lutheran) Church Arpad Dolinski.
Serbian Orthodox Bishop of the Baka region Irinej (Bulovi) and Bishop of the Reformed
Christian Church Ištvan ete Semeši also attended the service.  A conference on the79
contribution of churches can make to the cultural, religious and interethnic cooperation on the
path to European integration, held in Subotica and Beej between 22 and 24 November 2004,
was one of the most significant events of recent times. It was organized by the Diocese of
Baka of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the Roman Catholic Bishopric of Subotica, with
the support of the Reformed Christian Church, the Slovak Evangelical Church and the
Evangelical Christian Church. Beside the highest-level leaders of these churches,
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representatives of the government, including Minister for Religious Affairs Milan Radulovi
and Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Koštunica, as well as delegates of the councils of ethnic
minorities and non-governmental organizations also participated.  The official message of80
the conference, adopted at the end of the working meetings, called churches to a “fruitful
dialogue fraternal cooperation.”81
As Serbia is aiming at European integration, the situation of ethnic and religious
minorities in the country has become an important issue for discussion. In an effort to engage
religious leaders in building a tolerant society, President of Serbia Boris Tadi visited the
town of Novi Pazar in November 2004 as the first Serbian president to pay a visit to the
headquarters of the Islamic Community of Sandžak, where he met with Mufti Muamer
Zukorli. During his visit Tadi stated that “in order for this society to develop further, it
needs to understand itself as multiethnic and multiconfessional” and that “tolerance is the
principle of the future existence of this society.”  President Tadi also met with high-level82
representatives of the Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Lutheran and Reformed churches
in Novi Sad in March 2005, where they discussed issues relating to the churches’
involvement in public life, the return of property to religious communities and religious
assistance in the armed forces.83
Serbia: On the Road toward Religious Pluralism?
Eileen Barker from the London School of Economics calls our attention to the
difference between religious diversity, meaning the existence of many different religions, and
pluralism, meaning the “relatively peaceful coexistence and cooperation of different religious
confessions.”  Religious diversity is a given factor in Serbian society. Whether it will be84
turned into cooperation, which is beneficial for all, is yet to be seen. Of course, reaching
religious pluralism is not without its challenges. Stephen V. Monsma and J. Christopher
Soper describe three basic questions that arise in a pluralistic situation, two of which are
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relevant for the present-day Serbian context.  First, how far can a democratic polity go in85
permitting religiously motivated behavior that is contrary to societal and welfare norms?
Liberal philosopher Will Kymlicka in writing about minority groups condemns what he terms
internal restrictions, which “limit the right of group members to question and revise
traditional authorities and practices.”  Looking at the example of Western democracies, who86
have dealt with such issues in recent years, we can conclude that no general rule exists, but
ensuring the protection of the constitutionally guaranteed human rights and health of
individuals is always seen as a priority.
Secondly, Monsma and Soper ask, should the state encourage and promote
consensual religious beliefs and traditions in an attempt to support the common values and
beliefs that bind a society together and make possible limited, democratic government? As a
response, Mient Jan Faber emphasizes the importance of finding a common value system
among religious communities, which can “stimulate in the whole of society a common value
system,” especially in the present-day Serbian situation, where many religious communities
have, until recently, regarded each other as enemies.87
The government’s responsibility in a democratic society, where church and state are
separate and the freedom of religion and the equality of all religious communities is
guaranteed, is to provide an impartial and evenly balanced environment for all these
communities. Although the importance and special contribution of the Serbian Orthodox
Church to Serbian society cannot be denied and should be given due recognition, the legal
standing of all religious communities should be placed on the same level. In my view, recent
governments have not treated the resolution of outstanding questions regarding religious
communities as their high priority. Therefore, I see a need for the present government to take
further action by legislation and by exhibiting an equally neutral attitude toward all religious
communities. The comment made by Minister of Religious Affairs Milan Radulovi in 2004,
in which he states that he wants the country’s recognized religious communities to have a say
in which religious communities and under what circumstances can be legally recognized,88
causes concern regarding the direction for the future.
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 The example of one Protestant Evangelical church from the southern Serbian town of Leskovac illustrates90
this: its more than one thousand members are mostly Roma. Whereas the Roma in Serbia have traditionally been
presumed to be mainly Orthodox, this church and its affiliate churches in southern Serbia are challenging this
stereotype.
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Violations of human rights in the form of violent attacks against religious
communities as well as religious hate speech do not show a tendency of abating. In my
opinion, in such a situation a more concerned and efficient response by the police and
eventually the country’s court system would be necessary. As the government is limited in its
scope of action (and in its role to provide remedy for all societal evils) a stronger civil society
will be an important actor in bringing change to the current situation. Networks of non-
governmental organizations, citizens’ groupings, voluntary associations and the like will be
able to rally around certain issues and raise their voices. Civil society networks already exist
in Serbia but “the government has been slow to approve legislation that limits the possibilities
for political interference in their registration and activities.”89
Society is never a static entity and old stereotypes, true for centuries, may not
accurately describe reality anymore. Whereas “being a Serb means being an Orthodox” still
rings true for many people, religious affiliation seems to now run less along ethnic lines,
especially among the younger generation. Demographic presumptions made by statisticians
and politicians are being challenged.  The Serbian state will have to take into consideration90
the ever-changing dynamics of society if it wishes to provide relevant solutions to these
dominant problems.
